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Abstract: Following Lewis, it is widely held that branching worlds
di¤er in important ways from diverging worlds. There is, however,
a simple and natural semantics under which sentences uttered in
branching worlds have much the same truth conditions as they do
in diverging worlds. Under this semantics, whether branching or
diverging, speakers cannot say in advance which branch or world is
theirs. They are uncertain as to the outcome. This same seman-
tics ensures the truth of utterances typically made about quantum
mechanical contingencies, including statements of uncertainty, if the
Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. The inco-
herence problemof the Everett interpretation, that it can give no
meaning to the notion of uncertainty, is thereby solved.
1 Metaphysics
Lewiss answer to Parts central puzzle on identity in the face of ssion, or
branching as we shall call it, has won few supporters. But this may be because
his argument (Lewis 1976) took a wrong turn, rather than that it was inherently
wrong-headed.
In the face of branching, Lewis proposed that we say two persons are present
throughout, even prior to branching. This is equivalent to the stipulation, physi-
calistically, that personsand continuantsare non-branching but possibly over-
lapping spacetime worms. There are plenty of homely analogies: the Chester
A. Arthur Parkway, he observed, merges with Route 137 for a brief stretch, but
still there are two roads.
But as the spatial example shows, there are times when we also say that
there is only one thing present for example, when saying how many roads (to
someone with an inrmity) a man has to cross. Even more so in the temporal
case: surely we want to say, prior to branching, that there is only one person
present. The answer is that indeed sometimes we want to say the one thing,
sometimes the other, depending on context. Fixing on the local state of a¤airs,
we should say there is one road (one stretch of road) or one person present (one
common stretch of persons), whereas considering the global, we should say there
are two. Local, spatially, means we count the roads as identical-at-x i¤ they
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share a spatial part at position x; temporally, suggested Lewis, we should count
continuants C1 and C2 as identical-at-t i¤ they share a temporal part at time
t. The latter he called tensed identity. With all this we are agreed.
But Lewis went on to attribute thoughts (and we must suppose utterances)
at time t to the common temporal parts of speakers at time t. Why so? In
the absence of branching, utterances are naturally attributed to persons, which,
from a four-dimensional point of view, are either maximal continuants or stages.
To attribute them to stages that are not persons would seem to be perverse.
We do better to attribute thoughts and utterances at t to continuants C
at t. That is, thoughts or utterances are attributed to ordered pairs hC; ti or
slices of persons hC;Si, S 2 C, not to temporal parts S themselves. This is to
apply whether or not there is branching. In the absence of branching we obtain
the standard worm-theory view; in the presence of branching, we conclude that
there are two or more thoughts or utterances expressed at t, one for each of the
continuants that overlap at that time.
Lewis ruled out this semantics peremptorily. Suppose continuants C1 and
C2 share the temporal part S at t, and suppose C1 dies shortly after branching,
whilst C2 survives. Then, said Lewis, C1 and C2 cannot share the straight-
forward commonsensical desire that he himself survive, because
The shared stage S does the thinking for both of the continuants
to which it belongs. Any thought it has must be shared. It cannot
desire one thing on behalf of C1 and another on behalf of C2. If it
has an urgent, self-interested desire for survival on the part of C1,
that very thought must also be an urgent, self-interested (and not
merely benevolent) desire for survival on the part of C2. It is not
possible that one thought should be both. So it is not possible for S
to have such a desire on behalf of C1. So it is not possible for C1 at t
to have the straight-forward commonsensical desire that he himself
survive. (Lewis 1976 p. 74).
True enough, if there is only one thought. But why not if there are two, if the
referent of I myself, thought or uttered at time t (at temporal part S) is a
continuant, as in the non-branching case? Lewis is driving at the conclusion
that since the straight-forward desires are not to be had, we should settle for
something not so commonsensical, on e.g. the desire let at least one of us
survive (what he calls weak survival). But the more conservative option is
surely more attractive: why not allow that C1 and C2 each desires to survive?
And look at what they say: I will survive, on our proposed semantics, will
be true in C1s mouth, false in C2s, but since there is nothing to distinguish
them prior to branching, neither can know the truth value of his utterance, for
neither can know which of C1 and C2 he is.
That makes the branching of persons curiously similar to mere divergence,
where the common segment of two branching persons is rather counted as two,
numerically distinct segments, of disjoint worlds. Lewis was at pains in On
the Plurality of Worlds to distinguish branching from divergence, whereas on
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our proposal we are driving them together. Of course they are quite di¤erent
taken as processes within a single, non-branching world: the challenge is to
say how they di¤er when it is worlds that branch or diverge as wholes. As
Lewis recognized, when it comes to the initial segments of diverging worlds that
from the point of view of branching count as one, the similarity relation ex
hypothesi holds exactly; exact similarityis a transitive relation; in this limit,
the formal discrepancy between similarity and identity disappears (Lewis 1986
p.209). That observation e¤ectively neutralizes the intuition that branching is
di¤erent from divergence because it yields de re transworld identities: replace
identity with exact similarity, and one has a relation which functions exactly
the same.
Lewis has two objections to branching worlds. The rst is that it makes
nonsense of ordinary beliefs about the future  that is the worry we have so
far been dispelling and the other is the the problem of intrinsic accidentals.
If we are right that there is little di¤erence between branching and divergence
on the semantics we are considering, the latter problem should arise equally for
diverging worlds. The problem is this: if what is possible for C are the properties
that C has in all possible worlds that contain C, then C has all its accidental
intrinsic properties in all worlds possible for C. So it has all its accidental
intrinsic properties necessarily. And indeed, the same problem arises for exact
counterparthood as for identity, if what is possible for C are the properties that
C has in all possible worlds in which it has an exact counterpart.
Lewis solves this problem by dening modal properties by an approximate
counterpart relation, not the exact one that had the same formal structure as
identity. No similar retreat is possible for branching worlds if de re identities
play the fundamental role in the modalities. Does this sharply distinguish over-
lap from branching? Not really; as Lewis aknowledged, the de re identities do
not have to play this fundamental role, no more than the exact counterpart
relation does for diverging worlds. But anyway, on either framework there is
a ready solution to the problem of intrinsic accidentals in which de re iden-
tity, respectively exact counterparthood, does play a fundamental role to modal
properties: it is enough that there be identities among temporal parts. Thus: a
thing C might have had property P insofar as it has a temporal part of a thing
C 0 which has property P . Al Gore might have won the 2000 US presidential
election, so long as he has a temporal part which is a part of a person who won
or, using counterpart theory, so long as he has a temporal part exactly similar
to a part of a person who won.
One can put the matter in terms of tensed identity instead: branching and
overlapping worlds are only made to look the same by using tensed identity.
Elsewhere Lewis wrote of tensed identity as a somewhat unnatural and ad hoc
device (Lewis 1986 p.218-19), as applied to ssion within a world. But it is
not remotely ad hoc or unnatural at the level of branching worlds. If it is the
world as a whole that is branching, there is never any question of observing the
di¤erence between branching as opposed to diverging worlds. One is, moreover,
always concerned with just one world. If Al Gore had won the election he would
have tried to save the Amazonian rainforest. Which rainforest did he want to
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save? Why, his rainforest, the one (unique continuant, in a unique world) to
which he (unique continuant, in a unique world) is spatiotemporally related.
So there is no doubt about how many rainforests Al Gore was trying to save:
just the one, his own - the same number as by counting with tensed identity.
Whatever Lewiss reasons for insisting that thoughts are shared on overlap,
and must have the same content, they went unstated. The claim is incompatible
with ordinary language (which attributes thoughts to persons), and demands
a strange attitude to personal survival (we should desire that at least one of
us survives), in conict with the use of tensed identity (which he otherwise
favoured). He gave no consideration of the more conservative and simpler se-
mantics that we are proposing. Indeed, let thoughts be attributed to persons,
as maximal continuants, and the semantics of branching and diverging worlds
hardly di¤er.
We have deduced that on this semantics one cannot say which person one
is, and hence that one cannot say what ones future is. Nor is there anything
peculiar to the rst person in such admissions: so long as everyone is subject to
branching, I dont know which branch is yours, you dont know which branch is
theirs (because we dont know which branch is ours). That is, on this semantics,
branching can be understood as objective uncertainty. That is an idea that was
never suggested by Lewis.
2 Physics
If not suggested by Lewis, it will hardly have been suggested by his critics.
The important remaining distinction between branching worlds and diverging
worlds, not so far canvassed, arises if only one of all the worlds is real. In that
case perfect similarity cannot have the same properties as identity after all (the
real world may be perfectly similar, as goes an initial segment, with an abstract
or otherwise ersatz possible world; but it cannot be identical with it). In other
words, branching as an alternative to divergence is only available to modal
realists. And our conclusion, that a modal realism, with overlap, carries with
it a notion of objective uncertainty, only opens up further questions. Can it be
quantied as probability? If so it appears to be a single-case probability, that is
as yet unrelated to statistics. In view of the unexpected similarity of branching
with divergence, it is presumably a form of probability that can be analyzed
in terms of the exact counterpart relation; but then it appears to depend on
the whole space of possible worlds. And what about the converse of branching,
recombination, or converging of possible worlds?
These are deep waters for metaphysicians. No wonder branching has been
looked on with suspicion by all parties to the debate.
All parties, that is, save one. What if one takes seriously modern physics,
and specically, the most successful fundamental theory of modern physics,
quantum mechanics? For quantum mechanics, under the only interpretation to
date that can lay claim to being a realist interpretation (the only interpretation
under which we have claim to have a serviceable and universal theory at all),
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appears to be saying that the world is constantly branching - if not branching
into all possible worlds, then branching into all physically possible worlds. And
that it is ubiquitously a branching process, not a recombining or converging of
worlds, at least at the macroscopic level.
The theory in question is Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM), one of
the three realist theories (or classes of theory) of the microworld that extend
smoothly to the macroscopic. The other two are hidden-variable theories, such
as the de Broglie-Bohm theory, and dynamical state-reduction theories, such as
the Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber theory. But neither dBB or GRW theories
have any satisfactory relativistic formulation, despite years  decades in the
case of dBB  of attempts to dene one. EQM is the only theory so far on
the books that is empirically adequate to particle physics. That is because it
is no more than an interpretation of the extant formalism, one which rests on
no special feature of the non-relativistic theory. dBB and GRW theories, in
contrast, supplement or modify the formalism, in a way that only makes sense
(or has to date only made sense) in the non-relativistic context.
The key additional feature of EQM, in the broad brush of metaphysics, is
that branches come with weights  quantities whose sum is preserved under
branching. That, and the interpretation of branching in terms of objective
uncertainty, is not quite enough to ensure that weights can be identied as
probabilities, but it goes a long way in that direction (what more is needed is
provided in EQM). But no condition of this kind could ever have been seriously
presented by a metaphysician as an a priori hypothesis about modal space. It
has too much of the avour of a physical theory.
That evidently transforms the nature of the argument, on both sides. EQM
has long been criticized on the grounds that it can make no sense of probability.
That it makes quantitative sense that branch weights should be identied as
probability and not some other quantity  is an argument that has now been
spelt out in a series of papers (see Wallace 2005a, Saunders 2005, and references
therein). There remains, however, the incoherence objection: the objection that
the theory has no place for the notion of uncertainty (see e.g. Greaves 2004).
But uncertainty, as we have seen, is the right epistemic attitude to branching,
if thoughts and utterances are ascribed to persons. And on the other side,
the known unknowns of a modal realism with branching worlds are solved or
bypassed by the physics. We had uncertainty, which we had no idea how to
quantify, and recombination or reconvergence of worlds, which we did not know
how to conceptualize; but EQM provides weights, and the dynamics leads to
branching (at the macroscopic level) taking place always with the same sense.
It will not do, in this changed situation, to object that the semantics we have
introduced is counter-intuitive: intuition, if we are talking of physical discoveries,
doesnt come into it. Or that it is contrary to some other that is well-accepted
 for how better to account for the fact that we have had such di¢ culty in
understanding quantum mechanics correctly? Still less that there may be some
other, alternative semantics available: perhaps there is, but we are not looking
for any deep metaphysical truth in our choice of semantics. We are looking for
serviceability.
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The criticism can only be that the semantics we are proposing is unintelli-
gible, or inconsistent, or that it is contrary to such basic assumptions in philo-
sophical logic or philosophy of language as to call into question too much else
that we take to be true. But that charge is clearly unfounded. The semantics
as given is simplicity itself: it is implausible that it harbours any inconsistency.
Nor is it contrary to basic assumptions in philosophical logic: it preserves biva-
lence, it preserves the platitude that utterances are attributed to persons, and
it preserves the standard form of four-dimensionalism, that persons are maxi-
mal continuants. As for basic assumptions of philosophy of language, the view
we are proposing is the one positively enforced by them, in that meanings are
determined by use (Wallace 2005b): if EQM is true, words like uncertainty
are used just where there is ignorance of the ordinary sort, or where there is
branching  essentially, self-locating ignorance  so that is what those words
mean.
Granted all of this, there remains a question. If there is so little to choose
between branching and divergence, why not settle for divergence? Given which:
why not throw away all of the worlds save one? Doesnt this open the possi-
bility of a one-world solution to the problem of measurement, which like EQM
preserves quantum mechanics unchanged?
We should rst conrm the suspicion that there is indeed little to choose
between branching and divergence at the level of the representation of worlds.
The standard device for the latter is to dene a history space - a collection
of histories, each of them a unique continuant, a maximal sequence of world-
stages, where each stage is represented mathematically by a projection operator.
Fixing the set of projection operators, all possible histories constructible from
them are considered: the universal state then dictates their relative weights.
But from that one routinely passes to a representation of the universal state
in terms of a tree-like, dendritic structure, by collecting together histories all
with identical initial sequences of projection operators, and passing from rela-
tive weights of histories to relative conditional weights of histories, or relative
weights of branches. In applications of the formalism of quantum mechanics one
passes back and forth between the two representations without any ambiguity
or conceptual di¢ culty.
But that doesnt mean all the histories save one can be discarded. For the
key provision of EQM is that this branching structure to the state, or represen-
tation of the state in terms of a history space, is only one (albeit important)
structure to the universal wave-function, among various others and that it is an
emergent, approximate structure, arrived at in methodologically similar ways to
emergent ontology across the board in the special sciences and in the specialisms
of physics. These quasi-classical histories, so-called, are emergent just like pro-
teins in chemistry are emergent: they do not have a separate axiomatization, a
unique and exact description, separated o¤ from the larger dynamical story of
which they are a part. Hence neither does any single one of them. The larger
dynamical story of which quasi-classical worlds are parts is the wave-function
of the universe, the fundamental object of the theory, and the standard against
which other descriptions can be judged as approximations.
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To conclude: if as Lewis claims in cases of branching there are two persons
present even before the branch, then it is at least somewhat natural to attribute
two sets of thoughts to those persons; in the case of worlds branching, it becomes
entirely natural. Whether or not branching thereby nds new applications in
modal metaphysics is an open question, but since our best theories of physics
seem to describe branching worlds, it nds a natural application to the physical
universe.
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